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STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FRAP 35(b)

Yong Li v. Raytheon Company merits en banc rehearing because the case involves two questions of exceptional importance. The first question in this case is whether the two year gap did not defeat a finding of a causal connection between the protected activity in 2002 and the alleged actions in 2004 because Li was in Virginia in 2003 and the harassers did not have the opportunity to retaliate until 2004. The panel held that the two year gap defeated claim. The panel’s decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of United States Courts of Appeals in two other circuits which have addressed the same issue. See, Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F. 3d 554-55 (6th Cir. 2002); Porter v. California Dep’s of Corr., 419 F. 3d 885 (9th Cir. 2005); Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F. 3d 324 (6th Cir. 2007);

The second question in this case is whether the manager’s “no layoff” claim anchored the event of threatening layoff and transfer in early 2004 according to the third type (analogized discovery rule) of continuing violation doctrine (Li’s reply brief, p5, 2). See, Place v. Abbott Lab, 215 F.3d 803, (7th Cir. 06/01/2005) (The Seventh Circuit had indicated that the third type of continuing violation is more analogous to the discovery rule.); The panel did not touch on Li’s argument, because the panel preempted the retaliation claim by finding no causal connection and induced “the absence of a separate and timely violation of Title VII”. Whether the discovery rule is applicable in discrimination cases has never been addressed in the U.S. Supreme court . See footnote 10, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2162 (U.S. 05/29/2007) (We have previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a discovery rule. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2002); Because Ledbetter does not argue that such a rule would change the outcome in her case, we have no occasion to address this issue.)

Li urges the en banc court to reverse the panel’s decision on the first question, make a decision on the second question, and remand the case back to the panel for making a decision on whether Li had proved the “pretext plus” for the Title VII claims. In the alternative, Li requests that the court hold this case pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue of whether the “discovery rule” applies in Title VII cases in future.

ARGUMENT

I. The Court Should Reverse the Panel’s Decision That Two Year Gap Defeated the Retaliation Claim.

A. The Two Year Gap between the Filing the EEO Complaint in 2002 and the Series of Events in 2004 Did not Defeat a Finding of a Cause Connection because Li was in Virginia in 2003 and the Harassers Did Not Have the Opportunity to Retaliate Until 2004.

The panel erred by focusing on the two year period that elapsed here, and failed to take into account the surrounding facts. In particular, Li argued that although she filed a complaint to Raytheon EEO at the end of 2002, she was in Langley Virginia in 2003 and under different supervisors. Li requested that the HR make a further investigation in July 2003 because the HR failed to interview an important witness . When Li came back to Marlboro facility in January 2004, her ex-task manager Jen Lewis started staring at Li whenever they met alone, Li felt physically intimidated; Jen Lewis’ close friend, Ian Mitchell, had no opportunity to interfere with Li’s employment until he became the department manager; Li’s section manager Scott Oglesby did not harass Li until Li was under Mr. Mitchell’s supervision ; the HR did not have an opportunity to impose a mental evaluation to torture Li before she was harassed and worried about her safety, so did the subsequent events in later 2004.

In both the Sixth and Ninth circuit, the courts held that the lack of time proximity between protected activity and adverse action does not defeat a finding of causal nexus where the defendants did not have the capacity to retaliate during the lapse of time. See, Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F. 3d 554-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (the five-month interval between the protected activity and the adverse employment actions did not foreclose a finding of a causal connection because the plaintiff was under the control of a different supervisor during this period); See, Porter v. California Dep’s of Corr., 419 F. 3d 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (the multi-year gap between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse employment actions did not defeat a find of a cause connection because the plaintiff’s harasser did not have the opportunity to retaliate until he was given responsibility for making personnel decisions); See, Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F. 3d 324 (6th Cir. 2007); (The lack of temporal proximity between Dixon’s 1982 complaint and Reutter’s 1992 recommendation does not break the causal link between Dixon’s protected activity and the denial of his reinstatement FBI, [because Reutter had no authority or supervisory power over Dixon and was not in a position to legitimately interfere with his employment]);

B. The Panel Erred in Relying on the Precedents to Defeat the Inference of Causal Connection Based on Temporal Proximity, and Failed to Realize that the Petitioner’s Case is Distinguishable from Any Precedents in the First Circuit Court.

The panel erred in relying on the decisions in Dressler v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2003); Miller v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 296 F. 3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ; Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) .

In Dressler, although two years had elapsed between the time Dressler engaged in the protected activity in 1996 against Daniel and the time of the alleged adverse action in 1998, the party had “engaged in a sexual relationship extending for over one year” during the elapsed two years, and “The adverse actions charged by Dressler occurred after this sexual/romantic relationship had ended”. It is reasonably to say that the adverse action caused by the ending of the romantic relationship in 1998, not by the protected activity in 1996, and that is why the two year gap defeated the claim.

In Miller, the First Circuit did not involve any issue with respect to the causal connection issue, rather it acknowledges that Miller failed to anchor the time barred conduct with two year gap, because he failed to “identifying the date on which a Title VII claim accrues” when he was resembling his case to the case Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) ;

In Mesnick, Mesnick did not leave his department after he filed a complaint to EEOC. Although he had changed his immediate supervisor, the working circumstance did not change very much. If they had planed to retaliate against Mesnich, the action would occur soon, and would not likely wait for nine months. During the nine months, Mesnich was subjected to several “insubordination.” Because Mesnich failed to prove that the alleged insubordination was a pretext, and because he failed to prove that the real reason to fire him was with retaliatory intent, he could not prevail, and that is why the time gap works.

Back to the case at hand, Li was in Langley Virginia in 2003, and worked on the project CTO4 for NASA; while Jen Lewis, Ian Mitchell and Scott Oglesby were in Marlboro, Massachusetts and worked on the projects for Federal Aviation Administration. When Li came back to Marlborough in January 2004, she was in Charles Harbour’s department, and Jen Lewis had no influence on Li’s employment, though she stared at Li. Until April 2004, Li’s department merged into Mr. Mitchell’s department, and Mr. Mitchell immediately withheld permanent assignments from Li, and then the threatening layoff and pushing Li to quit started.

C. The Panel Erred by Splitting the Conducts in 2004 into Two Pieces When Ruling on the Causal Connection Issue.

The panel erred by separating the conducts in early 2004 (threaten layoff etc.) from the conducts in later 2004 (the EAP’s mental torture, putting Li on paid leave, hiding the doctor’s report etc.) when ruling on the causal connection issue. The conducts in 2004 are a chain of actions and there is no gap between them, and they should share the same temporal proximity with respect to the protected activity in 2002 or in 2003. In McDonough v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2006), McDonough was under retaliation and worried about his personal safety, the City of Quincy’s putting him on administrative leave and ordering him to see a psychiatrist constituted a retaliatory act. Although the putting of McDonough on administrative leave caused by his personal safety concern and did not directly link to his original protected activity, the causal connection still existed between the events, because his safety concern caused by the retaliation and related back to the protected activity.
Back to the Petitioner’s case, not only Li’s filing a complaint to EEO in 2002 or 2003 is a protected activity, but also Li’s complaint about the retaliation [reported the harassment, addressed safety concern, report to the CEO, requested doctor’s report, and applied medical leave etc.] constitute protected activities. The causal connection existed not only between the filing a complaint to EEO in 2002 and the events in 2004, but also between the complaints of retaliation in early 2004 and the adverse events in later 2004.

If the Court is going to rule on the finding of causal connection for the conducts in early 2004 but not for the conducts in later 2004, the Petitioner respectfully requests the detail opinions and explanation on this issue!!!

D. The Panel Erred by Failing to Consider the Proffered Specific Evidence Which Could Establish the Causal Connection

Mr. Oglesby directly told Li “it’s time to leave this company” because Li “have problem[s] with Jen Lewis.” Mr. Oglesby’s comment was quoted into Li’s email to the lab manager on June 1, 2004 (A 181). However, neither the managers nor the HR took action with respect to such comments (Li’s brief, p7). Even after Li found a permanent assignment in the project ERAM, Mr. Oglesby still sneered at Li on July 29, 2004 and said “when Jen Lewis becomes the lab manager, you will be in trouble.”

Ian Mitchell admitted in his affidavit that he knew Li’s complaint in 2002 (A 099, 3). He and Jen Lewis had shared one cubical for years until he became the department manager and moved into a window office; In November 2003, Mr. Mitchell had attempted to stop Li from coming back to Marlboro when he was the temporary department manager, fortunately, Li’s manager down Virginia bypassed Mr. Mitchell and transferred Li back to Marlboro into Charles Harbour’s department (Li’s brief, pp7-8);

II. The Court Should Make A Decision On Whether the Third Type of Continuing Doctrine, the “Discovery Rule”, Applies to This Case.

Because the panel erred by finding no causal connection between the protected activity and the alleged conducts in 2004 based on time proximity alone, the panel preempted the prima facie of the retaliation claim. Due to the panel preempted the retaliation claim, the panel found “the absence of a separate and timely violation of Title VII,” which preempted Li’s argument on continuing violation. Therefore, the panel did not touch on Li’s argument on the third type of the three-factor test under continuing violation doctrine, to which Li had raised in her Reply Brief, page 5, 2, “[that several circuits] applied a three-factor test; the most important factor concerned whether ‘the nature of the violations should trigger an employee’s awareness of the need to assert her rights.’” Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1415 and n.6 (10th Cir. 1993) ; see also West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 and n.9 (3d Cir. 1995) ; Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Bell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 929 F.2d 220, 223-25 (6th Cir. 1991) ; Roberts v. Gadsden Mem’l Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 801 (11th Cir. 1998) .

As noticed, the Seventh Circuit had indicated that the third type of continuing violation is more analogous to the “discovery rule.” Place v. Abbott Lab, 215 F.3d 803, (7th Cir. 06/01/2005) .

A. Whether the Conduct on July 29, 2004 Was an Anchoring Event for Purposes of the Continuing Violation Doctrine.

The panel misperceived that the conduct on July 29, 2004 was “an earlier conversation with her section manager …” and failed to draw a reasonable inference that this conduct was deceptive harassment. On July 29, 2004, Mr. Oglesby deliberately denied “No, I never said that [the company is going to layoff, I’m sure your name is on the list], you can not prove. Actually there was no layoff,” Li was shocked. Mr. Oglesby also laughed at Li “When Jen Lewis becomes the lab manager, you will be in trouble,” Li replied “Bill Clinton became the president, Paula Jones was safety,” Mr. Oglesby reprimanded Li “Shame!” (Li’s brief, p18) On the same day, Li sent an email to Arthur Buliung and addressed her personal safety concern.

Raytheon simply claimed that Mr. Oglesby’s conduct on July 29, 2004 was not an anchoring event for purposes of the continuing violations doctrine, because Mr. Oglesby’s warning Li “be in trouble” with Jen Lewis and denial of layoff threaten was not “retaliatory action” as a matter of law, and did not produce material harm. However, an anchoring event may not be actionable on its own. See, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2002) (a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own); Further, Mr. Oglesby’s denial of the layoff story and the claim “actually there was no layoff” revealed an objective deceit and intimidated against Li, as if “yes, we lied, so?” The deliberately deceit, the reprimand of “Shame”, combining with Jen Lewis’ constant staring, triggered Li’s personal safety concern, which could be an account as a significant harm.
Li intended to use the conduct on July 29, 2004 to anchor the prior adverse action. The problem is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan’s case allowed continuing doctrine only applies for hostile work environment claim, and the panel perceived the threatening layoff was a discrete act.

The closest rule to resolve this problem is the third type of continuing violation doctrine (“third type”) in the pre-Morgan stage, to which the appellant had raised in her Reply Brief, page 5, 2, and as the Seven Circuit indicated, the third type is more analogous to the “discovery rule.” Place v. Abbott Lab, 215 F.3d 803, (7th Cir. 06/01/2005) . Li attempted to expend the analogized discovery rule to be the normal discovery rule in order to anchor the time barred conduct in early 2004.

Before to discuss whether or what kind of “discovery rule” is applicable in Title VII cases, let us see whether the general discovery rule in common tort cases is warranted in this case.

B. Whether The Evidence in This Case Warranted the Normal Discovery Rule.

Mr. Oglesby was Li’s section manager and also the task manager by the time, and Li had no reason to doubt his layoff story, so that she applied for the job in Towson, Maryland, but she failed to get the job because it needed security clearance, and Li started to look for jobs outside Raytheon (Li’s reply brief, p4; A 167, §11). Li had been frustrated for months until she found an assignment in the project ERAM in June 2004. Later, Li addressed her suspicion to the HR and the Raytheon Asian Pacific Association (“RAPA”) leads , the HR set a meeting, but they did not inform Li of the layoff story, they constantly blamed Li for the problem with clearance. On July 29, 2004, Mr. Oglesby suddenly denied his layoff comments and claimed “actually there was no layoff”. Whether the original layoff story was true, or the claim of “no layoff” was false, one thing is clear: Li was harassed, and she only discovered the harassment on July 29, 2004. Even in the meeting on August 26, 2004, the lab manager Maryann King still told Li that there was some “list” and Li’s name was probably on the “list” (A 172, §37). Until 2006, Ian Mitchell confirmed that there was no layoff in 2004 and no list at all .

Specifically, if there was a layoff plan or if Li’s name was indeed on the layoff list, the suggestion to transfer Li to Maryland would become a good faith.

A “mere hunch, hint, suspicion, or rumor of a claim” is insufficient to trigger accrual of a claim. See, McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 2004) ((quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121 (2d. Cir. 1998) ). Moreover, Li defeated the reasonable diligence requirement. It was the HR’s cover up and misleading delayed Li’s awareness. Li did not “bury her head in the sand.” Skwira, 344 F.3d at 77 (quoting Diaz v. United States, 165 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999) ), and she immediately sent an email to the HR on July 29, 2004 to address her personal safety concern, which triggered the EAP’s question “do you want to kill someone”, which traumatized Li, aroused her suicidal thought, and resulted in long term disability. Therefore, the discovery rule appropriately applies here, and the statute of limitations for the layoff-threaten should begin to run on July 29, 2004.

[The panel perceived the TRAUMA event as merely “Li was angry”, and white-washed such mental torture and inhuman conduct. Li, who had no history of mental illness, suffered PTSD, suicidal thought, and became long term disabled. By July 2007, the side effects of psychiatric medication caused Li suffered brain tumor.]

C. The Court Should Make Decision on Whether the “Discovery Rule” is Applicable in Title VII cases

Whether the “discovery rule” is applicable in discrimination cases has never been addressed in U.S. Supreme court. See footnote 10, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2162 (U.S. 05/29/2007) (We have previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a discovery rule. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2002); Because Ledbetter does not argue that such a rule would change the outcome in her case, we have no occasion to address this issue.)

Back to the pre-Morgan stage among the appellate courts, three different formulations developed for determining when the doctrine should be invoked. The Tenth Circuit, along with the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, applied a three-factor test; the most important factor concerned whether “the nature of the violations should trigger an employee’s awareness of the need to assert her rights.” Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1415 and n.6 (10th Cir. 1993) ; see also West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 and n.9 (3d Cir. 1995) ; Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Bell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 929 F.2d 220, 223-25 (6th Cir. 1991) ; Roberts v. Gadsden Mem’l Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 801 (11th Cir. 1998) .
Another formulation, crafted in the Seventh Circuit, applied the continuing violations doctrine to cases where “it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which the conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable harassment only in the light of events that occurred later, within the period of the statute of limitations.” Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996) . This approach was adopted or cited with approval by the First, Fourth, and Federal Circuits. See Sabree v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 33, 921 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1990) ; Emmert v. Runyon, No. 98-2027 (4th Cir. 1999) (cited with approval) ; Bosley v. Merit Systems Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .

Back to the case in hand, the Petitioner’s issue is distinguishable from all of the precedents. Usually, the continuing violation triggered the victims’ awareness based on the pattern, frequency and permanency of the unlawful practice. However, Li’s awareness was triggered mainly by the “no layoff” notice, although Mr. Oglesby’s frequent referring to Li’s problems with Jen Lewis could make an account into pattern or frequency. Li’s case closer to the normal discovery rule in common tort claims.

The First Circuit accepted equitable tolling where the employer has actively misled the employee, See, Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 03/23/2006) ; Mercado v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel, 410 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 05/31/2005) . However, the tolling rule focus on whether the employer’s misleading prevented an employee’s awareness to sue, not the awareness of the unlawful fact. In the case in hand, the HR’s cover up prevented Li’s awareness of the fact.

The First Circuit adopted Johnson Notice to identify the date on which a Title VII claim accrues. See, Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). In Thomas case, the wrongful performance review did not produce tangible damage until Thomas was fired three years later. In the Petitioner’s case, the conduct of threatening layoff and transfer was an actionable retaliatory act but Li did not know the truth until the harassment on July 29, 2004. The harassment on July 29, 2004 alone, without pointing out the layoff threat, is not actionable.

The analogized “discovery rule”, the third type of continuing violation, is different from the normal discovery rule in common tort cases, because in common tort claims, the discovery rule applies whenever the victim discovered the damage; while under the continuing doctrine, the analogized discovery rule not only requests that the event triggers the victim’s awareness, but also the “trigger” itself has to be a continuing violation. Either way, Mr. Oglesby’s harassment on July 29, 2004 met the standard.

The Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to expand the third type of continuing violation doctrine, apply the general discovery rule into the continuing doctrine, and respectfully requests the Court to explain whether the discovery rule, under which doctrine, is applicable based on the facts in this case.

D. In the Alternative, the Court Should Reserve Its Decision on This Petition Pending the First Circuit or the Supreme Court’s Resolution of The Discovery Rule in Title VII Cases in Future.

As noticed, the Supreme Court has no occasion to address this issue of whether the “discovery rule” is applicable in discrimination cases. The Petitioner could not find any precedent addressed this issue in the First Circuit. Awaiting a future disposition by the Supreme Court or by the First Circuit before proceeding with rehearing of this issue serves the interests of judicial economy. Wherefore, a precedent decision in the future will provide this panel with the proper statute interpretation in order to properly resolve this case.

III. The Court Should Remand the Case Back to the Panel for Making Further Decisions on Li’s Title VII Claims.

The petitioner urges the Court to Remand the case back to the panel for making a decision on the issue of pretext and plus with respect to the conducts in early 2004 and the conducts in late 2004. Even if the Court ruled on that the conduct in early 2004 is time barred, the conducts in later 2004 could be merit as long as the Court accepted the causal connection to build the prima facie case.

A. With Respect to the Conduct of Threatening Layoff and Transfer in May 2004.

The decision of the retaliation claim, based on the threatened layoff and transfer, should depend on the decision about the discovery rule which was addressed in the previous section.

With respect to the conduct of the threatened layoff and push Li to quit or to transfer, Raytheon’s articulated reason was that Li had no security clearance. However, Li presented ample evidences in her briefs to prove the articulated reason was a pretext: In Li’s seven years employment in Raytheon, the security clearance never became the detriment factor, because there were always civil projects in Raytheon Marlborough facility and they could shift people around; there were about 26 engineers without clearance including Ian Mitchell himself, and Li was the only one being pushed to quit and transfer; There was no layoff in 2004, and the manager made false statement; A new hirer, Gordon Maxx, came to project ERAM in 2004 and worked into Li’s group.

Jen Lewis’ constantly staring directly presented the retaliatory animus. The panel misperceived that the staring was time barred, actually, the staring continued until August 2004 in the EAP’s meeting Li first time reported to the HR.

[ In June 2007, the Worker Comps judge found the staring incident after a few days testimony. The first time Jen Lewis stared at Li occurred in January 2004, Li was very nervous and quickly harried away, so that she sent an e-mail to a coworker, Ha Do; Most of these staring incidents occurred after June 21, 2004 when Li moved into Building-3, and Jen Lewis worked in the same building, and they would encounter each other more often; When Jen Lewis stared at Li, the impression was a hard look, a challenging look (A 166).]

B. With Respect to the EAP’s Interrogation, Putting Li on Administrative, Hiding Doctor’s Report, Hindering Li’s STD and Warned Li to Go back to Work.

Raytheon did not provide articulated and nondiscriminatory reasons for the conducts in later 2004, except one that “John Didio was not a Raytheon employee; he was employed by an EAP vendor of Raytheon.”

However, Mr. Didio’s stated in his letter to the license board that “the issue in the e-mail of possible danger to Ms. Li or her family appeared to be a human resources issue rather than a mental health issue” and it was Arthur Buliung insisted on that Li was emotional (A 218). Further, the meet was set in Arthur Buliung’s office, and Mr. Buliung controlled this meeting, and he let Mr. Didio get into the room again even Li rejected Mr. Didio’s interview and Mr. Didio left. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbin Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) ) (stating that a jury can find pretext where “the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence”) See, McDonough v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2006) ) (same).

The discriminatory animus reflected in Arthur Buliung’s extreme biased against Li, a Chinese woman, who had complained about Jen Lewis, a white female. On one side, Buliung perceived Li’s personal safety concern was an “insult” on Jen Lewis , so that he set EAP meeting to accuse Li of wanting to kill someone. On the other side, he left Jen Lewis’ staring incident no answer, and ignored Li’s safety at all. A reasonable jury could find no reason for such outrageous conduct except one: to punish Li for her complaint about Jen Lewis.

Raytheon systematically produced secret information to demonized Li. In 2002, the investigator Mattie Ervin produced a secret report, which collected negative opinions from the people whom Li had complained about, she ignored Li’s co-worker William Kerr’s opinion that Li was treated unfair. The secret report demonized Li as “strong personality” and “opinioned,” despite Li’s performance review stated “Yong was friendly and pleasant to work with” and the HR witness form stated “She was never confrontational.” In 2004, Raytheon sent the secret Mattie Ervin report to prefix Dr. Julia Reade’s evaluation, so that Dr. Reade ignored that Li was traumatized by EAP’s interrogation, and she blamed Li’s “personality” caused the employment problem.

Raytheon released information based on race, they sent Dr. Reade’s report to any Americans (MetLife, Workers Comps etc.), but declined to sent a copy to Li or to her Chinese doctors.

Raytheon changed “kill” to “harm” in order to white wash John Didio’s question “do you want to kill someone.” However, when Li asked back the same question, Raytheon used the word “what if I want to kill you” to attack Li, and they did not change “kill” to “harm” anymore.

The way Raytheon treated Li is inhuman. They mentally tortured Li, banned her right to report to RAPA or the CEO. They ignored her suicidal thought, hid the doctor’s report to hinder her STD. They warned her to go back to work and threatened to terminate her employment, and ignored the doctor stated Li suffered acute mental illness with psychotic feature.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to grant his Petition for Review, find that two year gap did not defeat the causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse actions, because Li was in Virginia and the harassers had no opportunity to retaliate until Li came back to Massachusetts; and apply the discovery rule into this case to anchor the time barred conduct in early 2004; and remand this case to the panel for further proceedings in finding the “pretext plus” with her Title VII claims.
In the alternative, the Petitioner requests that the Court reserve its decision on this petition pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the discovery rule issue in any Title VII claim in future.

Respectfully submitted,

YONG LI (pro se)

/s/_

Date: October 22, 2007